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1. The need for certiorari before judgment is even more
compelling now than when the Petition was filed.
Although briefing in the Court of Appeals will be
completed by January 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals has
announced that it will not hear oral argument until March 8,
2005, two months from now. Any opposition to certiorari
before judgment based on the Court of Appeals’ “expedited”
treatment of this case must therefore fail.
Moreover, the two other District Court Judges with
pending military-commission cases recently stayed them to
await the outcome of this case. Reply App. 1-4. As a result,
the entire commission process, and all pending challenges to
it, have ground to a halt. Every commission defendant now
sits at Guantanamo awaiting final resolution of the
exceptionally important questions presented in this case.
The proper disposition of this Petition boils down to one
question: Does the benefit of having the views of one Circuit
Court outweigh the need for prompt, final resolution by this
Court? In this unique case, involving pure questions of law,
the need for prompt and final resolution eclipses the value of
intermediate appellate guidance.
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2. It seems probable that the Court will decide – sooner
or later – the legality of the military commission process
challenged in this case. The process was established without
Congressional guidance and fails to provide what has long
been understood to be required by the Constitution,
international law, military law, and the common law. The
issue would appear to be not whether, but when, the Court
will grant review. Respondents agree that the questions are
exceptionally important and warrant swift resolution (Pet.
App. 49-52), as do many amici.1 This case will affect the wellbeing of Americans and other individuals from around the
world who have been or may be captured in armed conflicts.
The real-world need for this Court’s review regarding
the Executive’s legal interpretations is manifest. Compare,
e.g., Tr. of Oral Argument at 22-23, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No.
03-1027 (Question: “Suppose the executive says, `Mild
torture, we think, will help get this information?’…Some
systems do that to get information.” Answer “Well, our
executive doesn't”) with, e.g., Neil Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge
on Harsh Methods at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at
A11 (“While all the detainees were threatened with harsh
tactics if they did not cooperate, about one in six were
eventually subjected to those procedures, one former
interrogator estimated. The interrogator said that when new
interrogators arrived they were told they had great
flexibility in extracting information from detainees because
the Geneva Conventions did not apply at the base.”).
The questions presented here directly follow from, and
compare in magnitude to, those presented in Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 (1942), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 937 (1952), Reid v. Covert, 357 U.S. 1 (1957), and Wilson v.
Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 526 (1957). In all of these cases, the
Court granted certiorari before judgment. It would be hard
to devise a case that more clearly warrants certiorari before
judgment under this Court’s traditions and the Expediting
Act, 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) and §2101(e), than this one.
1 In addition to the amici who have filed briefs in this Court, eighteen
different entities filed amicus briefs in the Court of Appeals in support of
affirming the decision below.
These briefs are available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/publications.html#h.
Petitioner has asked the Court of Appeals for hearing en banc if certiorari
before judgment is denied. That Motion is available on the same website.
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3. Quirin, Respondents’ leading case, confirms that
certiorari before judgment is appropriate here. Pet. 7-8. In
Quirin, the Court ordered the case heard at the defendants’
request due to the “public importance of the questions raised”
and “because in our opinion the public interest required that
we consider and decide those questions without any
avoidable delay.” 317 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).
The Government’s efforts to distinguish Quirin on the
facts are unavailing.
Contrary to the Government’s
suggestions (Br. Opp. 13-15), (1) the Court did not grant
review in Quirin after the District Court “denied” the
defendants’ Petition, but instead granted review before the
District Court acted;2 (2) the defendants did not face
imminent execution when the Court granted review, instead
they had not even been found guilty by the commission;3
and (3) the Court did not place any weight on the citizenship
of the defendants, six of seven of whom were in any event
German, 317 U.S. at 20, 37-38.
Respondents’ efforts to avoid Quirin based on
subsequent case law are equally unavailing. Respondents
argue (at 14) that Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738
(1975) had not been decided. But Councilman did not
undercut Quirin’s emphasis on the “public interest”
warranting immediate review or announce an abstention
rule different from that in place during Quirin. See id. at 75456; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971); In re Grimley,
107 U.S. 147 (1890); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 28 App. D.C. 157
(1906). And also contrary to Respondents’ assertion (at 1314), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), did not make
the legality of the commissions challenged here clearer – and
therefore less certworthy – than that of those challenged in
Quirin. Respondents themselves acknowledge that the
Geneva Convention and UCMJ issues presented here “are all
novel.” Br. Opp. 10.4 In any event, Respondents’ claim
2 See Bittker, The World War II German Saboteurs' Case and Writs of
Certiorari Before Judgment by the Court of Appeals, 14 Const. Comment. 431,
446-51 (1997); Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. S. Ct. Hist. 61 (1996).
3 Id.
4 The Petition’s first question, which is essentially the same as
Respondents’ Questions 2-4, asks whether the Geneva Conventions
provide a judicially enforceable rule of decision. The Government has told
the D.C. Circuit that other Courts of Appeal have repeatedly confronted
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favors certiorari, for only this Court can determine the
meaning and reach of Quirin and Hamdi. See Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
4. Whatever weight the views of the Solicitor General
might be accorded in other contexts, here, as Respondent,5
he has already stated in the strongest terms the importance
of the questions presented. As the amicus briefs underscore,
Petitioner’s contention regarding the need for this Court’s
immediate resolution is widely shared.
The Government suggests that appellate review may
clarify the issues, analogizing this case to the detention cases
Hamdi and Rasul. But the questions presented do not
concern the President’s power to detain enemy combatants.
In assessing detention, judicial incrementalism and lowercourt percolation are appropriate to prevent shackling the
Executive. The test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), contemplated in Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-52
(plurality), for example, involves mixed questions of fact and
law that inherently lend themselves to careful evaluation by
lower courts of the specific circumstances in a given case.
This case, however, is entirely different. It presents pure
questions of law. The lawfulness of the means by which the
President has conjured these new tribunals and of the
procedures those tribunals employ are questions within the
particular expertise and ultimate authority of this Court.6
this general issue. Pet. App. 51. The Petition’s other question concerns the
interpretation and reach of this Court’s decisions in Quirin, Councilman,
and Hamdi, as well as Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946),
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
5 Cf. U.S. Br. Opp., Rasul v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, Nos.
03-334 and 03-343, at 19 (opposing certiorari because “[t]he potential for
interference with the core power of the President in this litigation is
therefore even more acute in this case than it was in Eisentrager.”), cert.
granted 540 U.S. 1003 (2003); U.S. Br. Opp., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696,
at 15-17 (similar), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1099 (2004).
6 Cases like Yamashita, supra, cited by Respondents (at 12) have no
relevance. Those cases concern battlefield commissions, not commissions
established years later and operating outside a theater of war. Those cases
also implicate specific-deterrence interests (“incapacitation”), which are
not at issue here because the Government has the power to detain enemy
combatants without commissions. Br. Opp. 8-9.

5
And should Petitioner ultimately prevail, unlawful
combatants would still be triable by courts-martial, Article
III courts, and commissions set up by Congress. (Congress
has expressly provided that violations of the laws of war are
triable in courts-martial. See 10 U.S.C. §818.)
This Court has preempted percolation among the courts
of appeals by concentrating all Guantanamo habeas
litigation in the D.C. Circuit. Pet. 13. Even within that single
Circuit, all other commission cases are in abeyance pending
Hamdan’s final resolution. Reply App. 1-4. Only a prompt
resolution of the questions presented by this Court can
deliver the requisite finality. The questions presented are
squarely raised in this case, making it an ideal vehicle for
their resolution.
5. The Government also contends that the Court might
avoid the questions presented if the commission proceedings
are allowed to run their course. It speculates that the Court
of Appeals may reverse the District Court’s decision that
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), does not
require abstention. This scenario seems unlikely, but, if
anything, it militates in favor of granting the Petition.
In the first place, even if Respondents’ scenario played
out in full and the commission acquitted Petitioner, that
would not end the matter: The Appointing Authority and
Review Board could send the case back to the commission;
and even if Petitioner were ultimately acquitted by the
Appointing Authority and the President, commission rules
permit Respondents to try Hamdan again on other offenses
(such as conspiring to commit some other offense, or even
aiding and abetting the same object offenses for which he is
currently charged). 32 C.F.R. §9.5(p). As long as the
Military Order stands, Respondents can subject Petitioner to
new trials, ad infinitum. Cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18
(1998) (“capable of repetition, yet evading review”).
Second, Councilman emphasized that in creating the
modern court-martial, Congress carefully balanced military
needs against procedural fairness. Id. at 758-60. It is
precisely this system that Respondents now reject.
Hamdan’s commission thus lacks the factual predicate for
abstention, a system "established by Congress and carefully
designed to protect not only military interests but [the
defendant’s] legitimate interests as well." Id. at 760.7 Should
7 Councilman’s formulation of “interests” tracks military law, where
constitutional rights are often minimal or nonexistent. Respondents
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a lower court extend Councilman to commissions, it must
first find that the tribunals are congressionally authorized
and fundamentally fair. A court decision to abstain, far from
militating against certiorari, would magnify the need for it.
This is particularly so because Petitioners’ presence rights
have already been violated in the commission. Pet. App. 27.
Even under the Councilman framework, abstention is an
equitable doctrine that requires balancing the legal interests
at stake. It is this Court and not a lower court that should
perform that task, and sooner rather than later. The trials of
Petitioner and other commission defendants pose some of
the most pressing and momentous issues of our times. Pet. 8
(quoting Milligan, supra). These trials should not be allowed
to proceed under a legal cloud; if their design is unlawful,
this Court should make that clear so that trials by legally
competent tribunals can begin. Alternatively, if these
commissions can go forward, they should do so with this
Court’s imprimatur. Waiting to decide the legality of the
commission process, with the possible result that convictions
will need to be undone and defendants retried, serves no
compelling interest and is contrary to the goals of efficiency
and finality. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
Indeed, if the Court of Appeals interpreted Councilman
as Respondents suggest, that new rule would have dramatic
reverberations. To take just one example, it would give the
Government the ability to evade for years habeas review of
any and all detainee cases by designating the detainees
eligible for commissions, a step that would eviscerate Rasul,
supra. See Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military
Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2004, at 1 (stating that the Counsel
to the Vice President at one point "urged" the White House
Counsel to seek a blanket designation of all the detainees
being sent to Guantanamo as eligible for trial under the
president's [November 13, 2001 military] order" and that the
White House Counsel "agreed").
6. The Government also tries to analogize the Petition to
a criminal interlocutory appeal. Yet “the interlocutory status
of the case may be no impediment to certiorari where the
opinion of the court below has decided an important issue,
otherwise worthy of review, and Supreme Court
nonetheless claim (at 16) that Hamdan lacks constitutional rights since he
has "no voluntary ties to the United States." This position, aside from
ignoring the "ties" the Government has created by seizing and detaining for
years a person who claims to be an innocent civilian, has already been
considered and rejected. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 & n.15 (2004).
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intervention may serve to hasten or finally resolve the
litigation.” Robert L. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice 260
(8th ed 2002); id., at 259-60 (citing eighteen cases of this Court,
including the UCMJ case Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435
(1987), which overruled the service-connection test at issue
in Councilman, supra). When Respondents desired similar
“interlocutory” review in In re Cheney, where separation-ofpowers questions were threshold issues, Respondents stated
it would serve no purpose to require the proceedings below
to run their course before granting review. U.S. Pet. 23-24, In
re Cheney, No. 03-475; U.S. Reply Br., No. 03-475, at 15. Such
a requirement would likewise serve no purpose here.
7. On the other side, the arguments for this Court to
hear this matter now are compelling. Because oral argument
in this case has been scheduled for March 8, this Petition
should be granted to avoid a crisis of legal uncertainty that
will becloud the commissions for many months. Were this a
case that might be expected to “go away” following the
decision of the Court of Appeals, denying the Petition to
obtain appellate guidance might be appropriate. But given
the gravity of the issues presented, a gravity Respondents
themselves have emphasized, this is not that case.
Mr. Hamdan has waited for over three years to have a
fair trial. Throughout this time, he has languished in
detention, deprived of his liberty and access to his wife and
children.8 As amici have pointed out, the danger to him, and
others like him, from continuing delay underscores the
importance of the issues presented, as well as the need to
8 The Government (at 8) mischaracterizes Hamdan’s federal-court
petition.
The lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention as an “enemy
combatant” will be academic if Petitioner may be imprisoned as a
defendant before a military commission. In his habeas petition, therefore,
Petitioner seeks to resolve the lawfulness of his detention as an “enemy
combatant” if his challenge to the commission succeeds. See Habeas
Petition, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1519, D.D.C., Prayer for Relief, ¶7-10.
Invalidation of the military commission process would also clear the
way for Petitioner’s evaluation and release by the Annual Review Board
procedure that the Government has established. See Special Defense
Department Briefing on Status of Military Tribunals, Dec. 20, 2004, at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041220-1841.html.
Hamdan, and others like him, cannot receive the benefit of these
annualized reviews until the commission process is concluded.
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move this case toward final resolution as soon as possible.
8. In arguing for reversal on the merits, Respondents
contend that federal courts may not review the President’s
interpretations of treaties, his determinations of the status of
individuals as unlawful belligerents, and any procedures he
may establish to try alleged violations of the laws of war.
This argument is contrary to the letter and spirit of Hamdi
and Rasul and, if accepted, would overturn two centuries of
decisions of this Court, including decisions overruling
Executive Branch interpretations of treaties and requiring
Executive Branch compliance with those treaties as judicially
construed.
Only this Court can decisively repudiate
Respondents’ extravagant claim of Executive prerogative.
This Court has long exercised its jurisdiction to evaluate the
legality of constitutionally extraordinary actions taken by the
President, Congress, and lower courts. E.g., Rasul, supra;
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Reid, supra; Youngstown, supra. The
Court should exercise such jurisdiction here.
a. In interpreting the Third Geneva Convention
(“GPW”), the District Court did not usurp Executive Branch
authority but performed its Article III duty to declare and
enforce “the supreme Law of the Land.” See Pet. 19-20; The
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (holding
treaties judicially enforceable when they "prescribe a rule by
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined"); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853); Kolovrat
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123
(1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
The District Court’s ruling that the GPW extends to
Petitioner and is judicially enforceable gives effect to the text
of the pertinent treaty provisions and the treaty’s ratification
history. In so ruling, the District Court applied the GPW in a
manner consistent with United States military practice since
World War II, a practice that has been and remains essential
to the protection of the men and women of the American
Armed Services captured in conflicts abroad. Pet. App. 15.
The Government’s claim that the GPW is not “judicially
enforceable” ignores its ratification history and the fact that
the treaty has long been given effect – and codified -- by
federal statutes and regulations. The positive federal law
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giving the GPW effect obviates the need to consider
whether, in the absence of such law, the President’s Military
Order violates the Suspension Clause. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct.
at 2650 (plurality opinion) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
301 (2001)); Ogbudimka v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 220-21
(C.A.3 2003); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Government claims (at 20) that the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) satisfy the GPW’s Article
5 requirement that a detainee’s POW status be determined
by a “competent tribunal.” But the Government has stated
that CRSTs are not Article 5 tribunals. DoD Background
Briefing on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal,
http://defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr200407070981.ht
ml. As the District Court noted, Respondents have
admitted that the CSRTs do not determine POW status but
simply decide “whether the detainee is properly detained as
an enemy combatant.” Pet. App. 13 (citations omitted).
b. The Government’s argument that 10 U.S.C §836 does
not require Petitioner to be tried under court-martial
procedures also misses the mark. The District Court's
reading of section 836 is not only faithful to the text of the
statute but also accords with historical practice: Even before
the enactment of the UCMJ, military commissions generally
followed the same procedures as courts-martial. See, e.g., W.
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 841 (2d ed. 1920).
In providing that the rules for military commissions
“may not be contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ,
§836 codified that longstanding tradition. The statute, as
interpreted by the District Court, does not require that all
rules for courts-martial and commissions be identical, and it
does not in any way encroach on the President's war
powers.9 Rather, the statute simply recognizes that the
confrontation right and the right to be present at all stages of
trial are fundamental. It is for that reason that the UCMJ
guarantees these rights in courts-martial and commissions.
Such rights are universally recognized as inviolable under
common law, military law, and international law. As the
9 U.S. Const., Art I, §8 gives Congress the power to "define and
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations." There is no doubt about
Congress's authority to legislate in this area.
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Court long ago observed, “[a] leading principle that
pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after
indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the
prisoner,” for the right to be present is of “peculiar
sacredness,” and necessitated by the “dictates of humanity.”
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372, 375 (1895) (emphasis
added). The integrity of American justice, and the honor of
its judicial institutions, demand that these rights be
respected. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1363
(2004); Amicus Br. of Noah Feldman, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
No. 04-5393 (C.A.D.C.) (Iraqi tribunal provides as "minimum
guarantees" that the accused will be "tried in his presence").
9. These issues will not be “narrowed” by intermediate
appellate review, for whatever that court decides, the
questions presented will remain. Respondents have done
everything possible to evade this Court’s review of its
commissions, from setting them up at Guantanamo to
changing their rules mid-stream. These maneuvers and rule
changes only highlight the commissions’ legal defects, all of
which are rooted in Respondents’ insistence that all
limitations on Executive Branch power disappear whenever
the President utters the magic words “military
commissions.” Until this Court clarifies that such limitations
do exist, a question specifically reserved by Quirin, 317 U.S.
at 29, 47, corrosive questions about the lawfulness of the
commissions will continue to fester.10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons as well as those set forth in
the Petition, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before
Judgment should be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
10 In this case, review by the federal judiciary is already under way
and cannot (and should not) be avoided. The challenge is to get it right on
the merits. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting); Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary, 62 A.B.A. J. 443, 444 (1976) (“any case decided in any district
court with a genuine need for swift review by the Supreme Court can be
the subject of a petition for certiorari before judgment” and “[n]o one can
accurately point to a case in which the Supreme Court has failed to give
expedited review when circumstances warranted that action”).
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